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Perhaps one of the most crucial philosophical questions to ask is 
"what is philosophy?" But, perhaps too, the possibility of asking that 
question points towards the fragmented nature of the enterprise. 
Through the shadows of Foucault and Derrida, I will try to show 
how this question is important since it continually expands the 
defmition ofphilosophy, blurring its territorial boundaries in such a 
way that enables an otherwise-thought world, preventing 
philosophy from being another disciplinary regime. Since antiquity, 
philosophy's reliance on a notion of truth provided it with analytical 
leverage. Hence, by placing the currency of truth itself under 
scrutiny, it is claimed that thinkers like Foucault and Derrida risk 
undermining philosophical inquiry tout court, reducing philosophy 
to rhetoric or fiction, with no critical function whatsoever. What's 
more, because of this, no normative grounding can be extrapolated 
from their ideas, no emancipatory aim can be sought and no ethical 
framework can be pursued. Both FoucauIt and Derrida were often 
criticized along these lines (Habermas, 1987). 
Through these two figures, however, one can conceive of 
philosophy as an activity concerning a critical engagement with 
society and culture on one hand, and an engagement with oneself on 
the other. With Foucault and Derrida, the stakes of theoretical 
inquiry can barely be any higher since thought becomes a risky 
activity: to think is to risk yourself in the process, to risk 
unfamiliarising the familiar. Radicalising the experience of 
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thrownness in the world, Foucault and Derrida insist that philosophy 
is not about solutions and resolutions. Concepts - our elements of 
thought - are shown to have an uncanny nature, able to play, entail 
ambivalent meanings and resist univocity. History is shown to be 
potentially malleable, to tell us incomplete and distorted stories, to 
contribute to our forgetting. Truth is shown to be less and less stable, 
exclusionary, non-neutral, ignoble. Reason is shown to be stifling, 
contingent, impatient. Freedom is shown to be provisional, 
conditional, illusory. We are shown to be effects, dominated, non-
transparent ... unimportant. 
Yet where does this leave us? Are we able to respond to this? 
Are we response-able? Irrespective of our stopping and thinking 
about it, politics goes on: laws are implemented and enforced, 
discrimination and domination persist, violence is a daily reality, 
injustices are ongoing. No matter what, ethics must go on: decisions 
are made, emotions are lived, conversations happen. Faced with 
thrownness into meaning, into a social reality, into a history, into 
mortality, any philosophy is a situated philosophy. Indeed, 
philosophy is the poly-situation within and upon which the 
philosopher operates. 
This characterisation can help us to proceed in thinking of 
philosophy as critique and as therapy. The intersection between the 
two concepts can be seen when, for example, what one is called 
becomes an issue, when what one is called does not square up with 
what one experiences, that is, when categorising becomes painful, 
when seeking intelligibility becomes violence. Through employing 
a critical apparatus with which to analyse this imposition, one is also 
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exposing oneself. Exposing in the sense of revealing and affIrming 
but, paradoxically, also of making susceptible to loss. One can strive 
to get rid of the burden of being misrecognised, but here one also 
faces the weight of weightlessness: revealing the contingencies of 
shackled identities does not only amount to emancipation, but also 
to the impossibility of being socially unidentifiable. 
This is where the conception ofphilosophy as therapy comes 
useful. Damaged by the carried shackles and scarred by the 
vulnerability of being exposed, one turns to philosophy to suture, 
structure and reconfigure oneself. This is not done by appealing to 
an extra-discursive or extra-existential realm. There are, of course, 
limits to language, to the thinkable and the liveable, but all these 
limits can be pushed, redefmed, renegotiated. Not at whim or at 
ease, but through commitment and risk. 
Foucault's characterisation of philosophy as a critical 
activity of thought bearing upon itself brings out this dual role of 
philosophy as critique and therapy. One's self is at the intersection 
since by critically engaging with power and social relations, with 
the ways in which life in society is organised, and the ways in which 
one consents to or is disconcerted by the manner in which identities 
are managed, one is reflecting on and possibly surpassing 
normalised ways of being and ofrelating to others. Does this amount 
to a categorical refusal and scepticism in the present, in whatever is 
widely considered a human achievement? Perhaps not. But it is a 
distrust in the pretension that one's knowledge can ever be complete 
or fmalised, and that knowledge of oneself and of others is possible. 
This does not amount to an uncritical search for novelty or 
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radicalism but of embracing an other without knowing it, without 
seeking to love it on the basis of being able to give an account of it. 
In a Nietzschean manner, this approach implies a life-
affirming yes-saying which is not blind with pretension of certainty. 
Although imbued with hesitance, it is an approach which embodies 
the courage to stand fast and withstand the fear of not knowing how 
to live, to affirm an identity which is recognisable but which is never 
conclusive. Through one's conduct, one steps forward and risks 
exposing oneself. This risk is not a blind and unconditional faith in 
one's thought but demands a constant revision of one's conceptual 
tools. As Foucault writes, philosophy is an activity which implicates 
its doer by transforming the philosopher's conduct and thought: 
[What] would be the value of the passion for 
knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of 
knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and 
to the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield 
of himself? (F oucault, 1992, p. 8) 
In this manner, Foucault conceived of philosophy as an 
askesis. This does not amount to an asceticism of self-renunciation 
or abstention, but is a self-forming activity, a risky engagement with 
truth, and a way of practising critique without the stable and 
reassuring grounds of truth and tradition (Foucault, 1997). But why 
refuse these grounds? What motivates this hesitance to 
acknowledge the merits of a history that has, arguably, fuelled so 
much human progress? Both Foucault and Derrida were concerned 
that supplanting and enabling this logic of progress and increasing 
clarity is a silencing and exclusion of sorts. The bright light of 
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Enlightenment reason is like a sharp blade violently tearing its way 
through the undecidable paths of language and history. Both 
Foucault and Derrida call out the inevitable violence underlying the 
dominant ways of doing philosophy and ethics embedded in truth 
(Foucault, 2001; Derrida, 2001). 
Through their reconfigurations of ethics, Foucault and 
Derrida shed further (inevitably violent) light on ethics, understood 
as the self s relation to itself and the self s relation to the other. By 
sustaining an ethos where things are to be assimilated before 
respected and accepted, or where things are to be identified as 
familiar before considered as meaningful, one risks reproducing the 
violence inherent even in the noblest of truths. This is because what 
potentially doesn't fit within our deeply cherished and hardened 
frameworks of truth aren't just mathematical propositions, but 
individuals or groups of people. This doesn't mean that abandoning 
the regimes and currencies of truth automatically amounts to the 
disappearance of exclusion and suffering, but that we should be 
ever-wary of the presupposition and pretension that increasing 
knowledge and its right implementation is equal to decreasing 
suffering. Perhaps we need to accept that a significant deal of 
suffering, hatred and exclusion may be fuelled by the unquestioned 
and unsuspected will for intelligibility. 
Surely, it is not a matter of doing away with discourses and 
conceptual frameworks, be they medical, legal, ethical and political 
notions such as well-being, rights, freedom and duty. The question 
concerns the grip, the cling with which we hold on to them in clear 
sight of the suffering and torment they constitute and contribute to. 
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The philosophical approaches ofFoucault and Derrida contribute to 
an attitude of complicating the activity of creating and utilising 
concepts by foregrounding their malleable nature and the danger 
these potentially entail in daily practices. The ethics and politics of 
concepts might be a suitable way of characterising the ideas of 
Foucault and Derrida. 
One could also say that their projects consist in a reverse 
Cartesianism of sorts. If Descartes proceeded from a destructive 
uncertainty to a stable certainty, Foucault and Derrida gnaw into an 
unstable certainty posing as an indispensable necessity, releasing a 
productive and necessary uncertainty. Here, one cannot but recall 
the ample criticism directed towards Foucault and Derrida - not 
without often lack of honest engagement with their works - who 
regard the two as rejoicing in the destruction of truth and as 
acclaimers of an amoral transgression with no ethical sensibility. 
But here one must look deeper into, say, Foucault's philosophical 
engagement with the courage of truth-telling (parrhesia) in his fmal 
lectures (2012) to gain insight into the sensibility involved both in 
the content of his work and into the attitude towards work. Faced 
with imminent death, continuous illness and physical pain, one can 
appreciate Foucault's work ethic - his engagement with classical 
texts, his commenting on philosophical askesis, his thoughts on 
thinking and living otherwise, on courageously being truthful and 
approaching death; and, too, of continuously recharacterising his 
own philosophical projects over the years and finding new lines of 
continuity, of being open to surprising oneself and to submit the 
comfort with which one understands oneself to critique. Foucault 
(2000), after all, didn't shy away from being for an ethic of 
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discomfort. A similar assessment can be made of Derrida's 
philosophical approach. After being diagnosed with a terminal 
illness, he too maintained an admirable philosophical ethos, as can 
be seen, amongst other sources, in an interview highlighting his lack 
of knowledge on how to personally deal with death, or in his ever-
open dialogue with a figure generally seen as lying on a different 
philosophical wavelength - Jiirgen Habermas (Derrida, 2007; 
Habermas & Derrida, 2003). 
Even if associated with so much controversy and polemical 
engagements with their work and with each other's work, the figures 
ofFoucault and Derrida continue to contribute to philosophy not so 
much through forming strong allegiances with their spectres but 
with the challenge they left behind them - the challenge of 
embracing and embodying the difficulty of their ethics; an ethics 
associated with critique, constant revision of one's conceptual 
apparatuses and the open-endedness, unfixity and undecidability of 
one's conclusions. Beyond lack of concern and sensibility, the 
works of Foucault and Derrida entail a radical understanding 
(amidst its incomprehensibility and unassumability) of 
responsibility, both towards oneself and towards the other. 
Alongside their critical understanding of philosophy, one mustn't 
neglect their therapeutic understanding of philosophy, which 
includes the ways through which one deals with oneself and others, 
as well as recognising the ailments of one's thoughts. It is a therapy 
which, however, excludes the potential of an attainable cure or 
salvation. Perhaps this is a philosophy that challenges our 
impatience to rashly confuse the cure with its lure. It is a therapy 
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which accepts limits and, especially, their malleability and their 
inability to bind. 
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